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ABSTRACT 
 
This study experimentally investigates auditors’ reliance on specialists’ work regarding 
complex estimates. Specifically, this paper examines how the relevance of specialists’ expertise 
(or the degree to which their prior experience matches the current task), the opportunity for 
auditor-specialist pairs to communicate, and the level of time pressure affect the extent to which 
auditors rely on specialists’ estimates. To investigate the research question, I employ a mixed 
experimental design in an abstract setting, where college students take on the roles of auditor and 
specialist and work in auditor-specialist pairs to complete an estimation task. I manipulate the 
relevance of specialists' expertise by providing specialists with training that matches 
(mismatches) the estimation task that follows, auditor-specialist communication by allowing 
auditor-specialist pairs to chat (not chat) on the computer, and time pressure by varying the 
amount of time given to enter each estimate. My results show that the relevance of specialists’ 
prior experience affects auditors’ perception of specialists’ expertise, which influences auditors’ 
trust in specialists, ultimately affecting auditors’ reliance in specialists’ advice. Additionally, 
auditor-specialist communication significantly affects auditors’ reliance on specialists, but only 
when specialists have relevant prior experience. Furthermore, auditors’ opportunity to 
communicate with specialists indirectly affects their reliance on specialists through their 
developed trust due to auditors’ perception of specialists’ expertise rather than a social bond. I 
also find that auditors’ reliance on specialists is significantly affected by the relevance of 
specialists’ prior experience, but only when time pressure is low. When time pressure is high, 
there is no significant difference in auditors’ reliance based on specialists’ prior experience.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Auditors’ use of specialists’ work on fair value measurements is heavily scrutinized. The 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) acknowledges current deficiencies and 
recently responded by issuing two proposals to strengthen auditing standards regarding auditors’ 
use of specialists (PCAOB 2017b) and auditing accounting estimates, including fair value 
measurements (PCAOB 2017a). The purpose of this study is to experimentally investigate 
several of the primary concerns indicated by regulators, practitioners, and academics. 
Specifically, this paper examines how the relevance of specialists’ expertise (or the degree to 
which their prior experience matches the current task) and their communication with audit teams 
affect the extent to which auditors rely on specialists’ estimates of fair value measurements, and 
whether this relationship is moderated by time pressure. 
Regulators encourage auditors to seek advice from specialists when dealing with 
complex, material matters that require knowledge or skill beyond auditors’ own expertise 
(AICPA 1994). Fair value measurements pose a unique challenge due to inherent estimation 
uncertainty arising from unobservable, subjective inputs and imprecise estimation ranges 
(Bratten, Gaynor, McDaniel, Montague, and Sierra 2013; Griffin 2014; Cannon and Bedard 
2017). As a result, they are fundamentally more difficult to audit. Following regulators’ 
recommendation, auditors who lack the expertise needed to make complex valuation judgments 
often seek advice from specialists who generally help test client models and assumptions and 
develop independent estimates (Griffith 2014; Cannon and Bedard 2017). 
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Although using specialists should improve audit quality (PCAOB 2017b), PCAOB 
inspections consistently indicate audit deficiencies regarding fair value measurements and the 
use of specialists due to, for example, auditors obtaining insufficient understanding of, and over-
relying on, specialists’ assumptions (Bratten et al. 2013; Boritz, Robinson, Wong, and 
Kochetova-Kozloski 2014; Cannon and Bedard 2017). Prior qualitative research supports these 
concerns, finding that some auditors over-rely on specialists’ work (Kadous and Zhou 2015), 
while others ignore it (Griffith 2014). Practitioners and academics note that a lack of regulatory 
guidance regarding the use of specialists in conjunction with inherent task complexity, 
communication problems, and various other factors make it difficult for auditors to appropriately 
assess and incorporate specialists’ work (Griffith 2014; Boritz et al. 2014).  
It is important to examine present weaknesses within the auditor-specialist relationship, 
particularly regarding fair value measurements, because fair value measurements are value-
relevant to financial statement users (Cannon and Bedard 2017) and inherently vulnerable to 
biased reporting due to estimation uncertainty (Bratten et al. 2013), yet auditors often lack the 
expertise to provide reasonable assurance over fair value measurements on their own.  Because 
the prevalence of fair value measurements in financial reporting is likely to continually grow 
(CAQ 2011; Cannon and Bedard 2017), and the use of specialists is linked to fair value 
measurements, the use of specialists is likely to grow as well. Therefore, it is increasingly 
important to evaluate how auditors integrate valuation specialists’ work with other audit 
evidence, as it directly impacts audit quality. 
This study considers conditions in which the specialist’s prior experience differs from 
his/her current valuation task, which is important because each engagement has unique valuation 
settings and not all knowledge of fair value measurements is transferrable. Valuation specialists 
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with prior stock-option pricing experience, for example, may not be the best choice to assess 
goodwill impairment, or vice versa (Bratten et al. 2013). Prior research indicates that auditors 
most often engage their firms’ in-house specialists when consulting valuation specialists. 
However, accounting firms may not always have an available specialist with experience that is 
specific to the auditor’s needs1 and, consequently, a mismatch is created between the specialist’s 
experience and the current valuation task. Such a mismatched specialist could still be helpful, but 
auditors should consider their background before heavily relying on their work (AICPA 1994). 
Regulators, however, have noted auditors’ failure to thoroughly assess the appropriateness of 
specialists’ qualifications (PCAOB 2015). 
Regulators, practitioners, and academics also note a pervasive lack of auditor-specialist 
communication, resulting in auditors’ insufficient understanding and testing of valuation models 
and assumptions as well as inconsistent follow-up procedures (Griffith 2014; PCAOB 2015). 
Communication problems between auditors and specialists are particularly concerning when 
specialists are mismatched because, without communicating, auditors are less likely to consider 
whether the assigned specialist is appropriate for the task and are, thus, less likely to reevaluate 
their reliance on the specialist’s work. Furthermore, academics note that time pressure to meet 
year-end deadlines can exacerbate the already-present communication issues (Griffith 2014). 
Due to the potential interdependence of specialist expertise, auditor-specialist communication, 
and time pressure, it is important to consider these three factors together. 
To investigate the research question, I employ a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed experimental design in 
an abstract setting, according to the tenets of experimental economics (Freidman and Sunder 
1994), where college students take on the roles of auditor and specialist and work in auditor-
                                                          
1
 For example, a firm may not employ a specialist with matching experience or a specialist with matching 
experience may not be available due to time constraints. 
4 
 
specialist pairs to complete an estimation task analogous to fair value measurements. The 
participants’ task is to guess the number of gumballs in a pictured container, and the general 
procedures follow that of a typical judge-advisor system, in which both parties independently 
make an initial decision simultaneously, the judge receives advice, and then the judge makes the 
final decision (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006; Kadous, Leiby, and Peecher 2013).
2
 Accordingly, in 
my study, the auditor and specialist each view a picture of a container filled with gumballs and 
make an initial estimate of the number of gumballs in the container. Then, the auditor learns the 
specialist’s estimate, after which the auditor makes a final estimate. 
Students in the specialist role receive training prior to the compensation rounds, during 
which they gain experience guessing the number of gumballs (weight of kernels of corn), 
creating a match (mismatch) with the experimental task, thus manipulating the relevance of 
specialist expertise. To manipulate communication, the auditor-specialist pair is either allowed to 
chat via the computer program, z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007), or work without chatting. Finally, to 
manipulate time pressure, each round has either a long or short time limit. Specialist expertise 
and communication are both manipulated between-subjects, but time pressure is manipulated 
within-subjects, so counterbalancing is implemented to control for potential order effects. The 
dependent measure of interest is how much those in the auditor role adjust their estimate based 
on the advice provided by those in the specialist role. 
My results indicate a significant effect of the relevance of specialists’ prior experience on 
auditors’ reliance on specialists, which is mediated through auditors’ perception of specialists’ 
expertise and their subsequent trust in specialists. Additionally, the opportunity to communicate 
significantly affects auditors’ reliance on specialists, but only when specialists have relevant 
                                                          
2
 The judge-advisor system has been applied in prior audit studies, such as when auditors seek informal advice from 
other auditors (e.g., Kadous, Leiby, and Peecher 2013). Because the judge-advisor system also represents the 
auditor-specialist relationship, it is appropriate for this study’s setting.  
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prior experience. I also find that auditors’ opportunity to communicate with specialists indirectly 
affects their reliance on specialists through their trust in specialists. Furthermore, when 
specialists have relevant prior experience, the opportunity to communicate with specialists 
increases auditors’ perception of specialists’ expertise as well as their bond with the specialist, 
but only the perceived specialist expertise affects auditors’ reliance on specialists’ advice. When 
specialists do not have relevant prior experience, the opportunity to communicate with specialists 
only increases auditors’ bond with the specialist, not their perception of specialists’ expertise, 
and only the perceived specialist expertise affects auditors’ reliance on specialists’ advice. 
Lastly, I find that auditors’ reliance on specialists is significantly affected by the relevance of 
specialists’ prior experience, but only under conditions of low time pressure. When high time 
pressure is present, there is no significant difference in auditors’ reliance based on specialists’ 
prior experience. 
This study has important practical implications because the PCAOB is considering 
revising existing auditing standards due to current reliance concerns regarding auditors’ use of 
specialists’ work over fair value measurements (PCAOB 2017a, b). Results from this study 
provide valuable insight for standard-setters by evaluating whether the relevance of specialists’ 
expertise affects auditors’ judgments and decisions when relying on specialists’ work and 
whether increased communication between auditors and specialists is a potential solution for 
current problems in the auditor-specialist relationship. This study also takes time pressure into 
account, which is highly applicable in the audit setting due to typical busy season time 
constraints. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section II provides background on auditing fair 
value measurements, advice-seeking and expertise, and auditors’ use of specialists; Section III 
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develops the hypotheses for specialist expertise, auditor-specialist communication, and time 
pressure; Section IV explains the research methodology; Section V discusses the study’s results; 
and Section VI concludes the paper. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Auditing Fair Value Measurements 
 Fair value measurements
3
 are informative to financial statement users and are 
increasingly required by regulators (Griffin 2014), yet they are inherently difficult to audit. 
Estimation uncertainty arises from a combination of input subjectivity and outcome imprecision, 
where input subjectivity refers to the input’s observability (classified as Level 1, 2, or 3) and 
outcome imprecision signifies a range of potential values (Griffin 2014), which creates unique 
complexity that involves significant judgment (Bratten et al. 2013). Evaluating fair value 
measurements also requires extensive knowledge and training outside auditors’ accounting 
expertise because various economic and business factors must be considered (CAQ 2011; 
Bratten et al. 2013). As a result, auditors may misinterpret valuation models’ critical risks and 
assumptions (Griffith, Hammersley, and Kadous 2015), potentially harming audit quality.  
Ambiguous guidance from standard-setters exacerbates the situation by demanding 
additional auditor judgment. AS 2501 and 2502 are both applicable to fair values in certain 
cases,
4
 but it may be unclear how to best apply the standards (Bratten et al. 2013). Furthermore, 
suggestions are given in lieu of specific guidelines, so auditors must decide whether to test 
management’s process, develop an independent estimate, or review subsequent events (Bratten et 
al. 2013; Griffith et al. 2015). Research shows that auditors often over-rely on management’s 
model and assumptions and simply verify the components rather than develop independent 
                                                          
3
 According to ASC 820, fair value is defined as “the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer 
a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date” (FASB 2011). 
4
 AS 2501 involves auditing all accounting estimates, whereas AS 2502 specifically focuses on fair value 
measurements and disclosures (AICPA 1989, 2003). 
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estimates and assertions to better gauge the reasonableness of the model (Griffith et al. 2015). 
Correspondingly, the PCAOB continually reports audit deficiencies related to fair value 
measurements (Cannon and Bedard 2017). 
Advice-Seeking and Expertise 
 Prior literature primarily focuses on taking, rather than giving, advice, but there is no 
comprehensive advice theory (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006). In general, an advisor provides advice 
to the decision-maker, referred to as the judge, who must then decide how to apply it. Research 
shows that, although seeking advice can improve judges’ decisions by reducing mistakes, better 
organizing information, and expanding focus (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006), judges often discount 
advisors’ recommendations due to, for example, anchoring (Tversky and Kahneman 1974), 
egocentric bias
5
 (Krueger 2003), or lack of justification (Yaniv 2004), which results in less 
optimal outcomes (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006). 
 Advisor expertise, however, is shown to reduce advice discounting (e.g., Harvey and 
Fischer 1997) because expert advice is viewed as more informative and is, thus, more persuasive, 
particularly in complex settings (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006). When complicated situations arise 
and judges do not possess the necessary knowledge or skills, they must rely on advisors (Giddens 
1990, 1991) who gain expertise through task-specific experiences and training (Bonner and 
Lewis 1990). Using expert advice gives judges a sense of comfort (Giddens 1990, 1991) because 
experts develop multifaceted cognitive structures through their experiences that allow them to 
better organize and process complex information (Spilker and Prawitt 1997). 
                                                          
5
 Harvey and Harries (2004) analyze anchoring and egocentrism, stating that anchoring is temporary and relates to 
the present stimulus, whereas egocentrism is a long-term effect based on one’s opinion. After running two 
experiments, Harvey and Harries (2004) conclude that egocentrism is the predominant cause of advice discounting 
compared to anchoring. 
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Auditors’ Use of Specialists 
 Auditors’ use of specialist advice continues to grow as the business environment becomes 
increasingly complex. Specialists are now involved in roughly 90 percent of the audits at large 
accounting firms (PCAOB 2015), are used for both private and public clients (Selley 1999), 
cover a variety of fields, such as tax, information technology, and forensic accounting, and can 
be incorporated at virtually any stage of the audit process (Bauer and Estep 2014; Boritz et al. 
2014). They are known to help with audit team selection, materiality and risk assessments, and 
audit planning, for example (Boritz et al. 2014). By seeking specialist advice, auditors can 
improve their professional skepticism and judgments, enhance defensibility through better 
justification, and reduce liability by shifting responsibility (Kadous et al. 2013). 
 Specialists are generally classified as either technical accounting or non-accounting and 
as either internal or external. Technical accounting specialists are experts in specific accounting 
and auditing issues, whereas non-accounting specialists’ expertise is in other fields, such as 
valuation and credit risk assessment. Internal specialists are those employed by the accounting 
firm, while external specialists work for a third-party and are contracted for the audit 
engagement (Griffith 2014). To evaluate concerns about auditing fair value measurements, this 
paper specifically focuses on the use of internal valuation specialists because the PCAOB notes 
that many large accounting firms employ specialists (PCAOB 2015), and prior valuation 
research indicates that the use of internal specialists is most prevalent.
6
 
Qualitative research reveals that valuation specialists assist auditors by evaluating 
preparer qualifications, analyzing preparer methodology, testing model accuracy, and evaluating 
underlying assumptions, such as discount rates, market benchmarks, and industry trends (Griffith 
                                                          
6
 Of the auditors interviewed in Griffith (2014), 26 utilized internal specialists compared to only 6 using external 
specialists. Also, Cannon and Bedard (2017) finds that auditors use valuation specialists in 86 percent of 
engagements, over 85 percent of whom are internal. 
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2014). They also help develop independent estimates for comparison purposes (Cannon and 
Bedard 2017). Auditors, on the other hand, focus on evaluating client-specific financial 
measures, such as expected revenues and expenses (Griffith 2014), which they can better assess 
due to their experience on the audit engagement. Actual practices may vary across engagements, 
though, due to a lack of specific guidance
7
 (Boritz et al. 2014; Griffith 2014). 
Concerns about Auditor Reliance on Specialist-provided Valuations 
Although seeking expert advice is one of the primary ways auditors can reduce 
estimation uncertainty surrounding complex estimates (Cannon and Bedard 2017), regulators, 
practitioners, and academics have expressed concern regarding auditors’ use of specialists’ work 
by identifying cases of both over- and under-reliance on specialists. According to AS 1210, when 
using a specialist, auditors must develop an understanding of the specialist’s method, test 
pertinent data, and evaluate the specialist’s conclusions (AICPA 1994; Cannon and Bedard 
2017), because even experts occasionally misinterpret information and give bad advice (Giddens 
1990; Kadous et al. 2013). To remain professionally skeptical, all audit evidence, including that 
from specialists, should be appropriately scrutinized (AICPA 1972). 
However, some studies find that auditors over-rely on specialists by failing to 
appropriately understand and evaluate the reasonableness of specialists’ methods and findings 
(Bratten et al. 2013; PCAOB 2015). Griffith (2014) notes that auditors are often more focused on 
their own work and less concerned with reviewing specialists’ work, possibly viewing it as 
peripheral (Kadous and Zhou 2015). Conversely, auditors are also shown to under-rely on 
                                                          
7
 AS 2501 and 2502 refer auditors to AS 1210 for guidance on the use of specialists (AICPA 1989, 2003). However, 
AS 1210 only covers external, non-accounting specialists. AS 1201 is for internal specialists, but only with technical 
accounting expertise (AICPA 2006). Therefore, there are no established guidelines for auditors using internal, non-
accounting specialists. Griffith (2014) finds that auditors often follow AS 1210 for internal valuation specialists, but 
it lacks specific details about when and how auditors should involve specialists. 
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specialists by ignoring specialist caveats
8
 they deem insignificant, editing specialist wording for 
clarification purposes, and even deleting information that contradicts other audit evidence 
because they consider it immaterial (Griffith 2015). As a result, the specialist report is modified 
in such a way that it supports the audit team’s own view and disregards specialist involvement. 
In either case of under- or overreliance, audit quality is diminished. 
 
  
                                                          
8
 Specialist caveats call attention to items the specialist thinks are important and/or require follow-up procedures. 
There are three types of caveats. Recommendation caveats suggest changes to the client’s current valuation method, 
open item caveats point out valuation inputs the auditor is responsible for testing, and reservation caveats describe 
potential problems uncovered during specialists’ tests (Griffith 2015). 
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III. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Specialist Expertise 
 Experts are considered reliable because they possess domain-specific knowledge that 
enables them to better interpret information in their identified field, and their expertise likely 
transfers between similar settings (Hammersley 2006), such as companies operating in the same 
industry. Prior research confirms that, in cases requiring industry-specific knowledge, industry 
expertise positively affects audit quality (for e.g., Bedard and Wright 1994; Wright and Wright 
1997; Wright and Bedard 2000). However, expertise is not generally applicable, and industry 
specialists working in a different industry lose their comparative advantage. Hammersley (2006) 
demonstrates that auditors with relevant, or matched, industry expertise develop more elaborate 
problem representations and, thus, respond to indications of potential misstatement more 
effectively than auditors with irrelevant, or mismatched, industry experience. 
Likewise, valuation specialists’ expertise and experiences are not automatically 
interchangeable due to the unique aspects of different valuation tasks (e.g. stock-option pricing 
versus estimating goodwill impairment) and distinct engagement settings (Bratten et al. 2013). 
Recognizing the importance of relevant expertise, AS 1210 states that auditors should evaluate 
whether the specialist’s qualifications are appropriate for the specific task when determining 
specialist involvement (AICPA 1994). However, the PCAOB maintains that auditors 
inadequately evaluate specialists’ expertise and need to more thoroughly assess specialists’ 
knowledge, skill, and objectivity (PCAOB 2015). Griffith (2015)’s results support this concern, 
finding that only 68 percent of auditors interviewed consider specialist characteristics, which 
13 
 
prompts the first set of hypotheses in this study examining auditors’ reliance on specialists with 
different degrees of relevant expertise. 
Bonaccio and Dalal (2006) state that the extent to which judges rely on advice is 
positively related to the level of trust they have in the advisor, which can be affected by 
numerous factors, including the advisor’s prior experience (Griffith 2014). As advisors obtain 
more task-relevant knowledge and experience, they develop “expert power”, which increases 
judges’ trust in advisors, prompting judges to weigh their advice more heavily (Bonaccio and 
Dalal 2006). Therefore, I propose a serial mediation model in which the relevance of specialists’ 
prior experience affects auditors’ perception of specialists' expertise and, thus, their trust in 
specialists, which ultimately affects auditors’ reliance on specialists’ advice. Auditors who 
receive advice from specialists with more relevant experience will weigh advice more heavily 
than those who receive advice from specialists with less relevant experience due to their 
perception of the specialist as a relevant expert, which increases their trust in the specialist. The 
first set of hypotheses is as follows: 
H1a: Auditors will rely more (less) heavily on specialists' advice when specialists have 
more (less) relevant, or matched (mismatched), experience. 
H1b: The relevance of specialists' experience indirectly affects auditors' reliance on 
specialists' advice through auditors' perceptions of specialists' expertise and their 
subsequent trust in specialists. 
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FIGURE 1 
Conceptual Diagram of Serial Mediation Analysis for H1 
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Auditor-Specialist Communication 
 Employed specialists at large accounting firms are often integrated into the core audit 
team (PCAOB 2015) and are involved throughout the engagement (Griffith 2015). However, 
valuations specialists are typically only engaged for certain tasks and are not considered audit 
team members (Boritz et al. 2014). Due to poor communication between auditors and valuation 
specialists, the current modular structure has resulted in auditors insufficiently understanding 
valuation models and assumptions, inadequately testing source data, discounting specialists’ 
findings, and failing to follow-up on specialist caveats (PCAOB 2015; Griffith 2015), which all 
increase the likelihood of audit deficiencies. To alleviate problems, the PCAOB recommends 
better auditor-specialist integration and communication (PCAOB 2015), which motivates my 
research question about communication. 
Prior qualitative research discusses how better communication between auditors and 
specialists leads to more effective collaboration between the two parties (Bauer and Estep 2014). 
By allowing specialists to provide auditors with their reasoning and justifications, inappropriate 
advice discounting should diminish (Yaniv 2004). Better communication may also help develop 
stronger social bonds and improve trust between the two parties. Bowlin, Hobson, and Piercey 
(2015) find that giving auditors and managers the opportunity to chat increases the extent to 
which auditors trust management representations. In this regard, improving communication 
between auditors and specialists should increase auditors’ trust in specialists and, thus, their 
reliance on specialists’ work.  
While this is likely beneficial when the specialist has relevant experience, it may be 
detrimental in cases of specialist mismatch. The trust heuristic results in heavily weighing advice 
regardless of justification, particularly in complex settings such as fair value measurements 
16 
 
(Kadous et al. 2013), so increased communication leading to increased trust could result in an 
overreliance on inappropriate advice. On the other hand, because trust in experts is affected by 
perceived expert effectiveness (Griffith 2014), bringing specialist mismatch to light through 
increased communication may reduce auditor reliance. Therefore, I expect auditor-specialist 
communication to affect auditors’ reliance on specialists through auditors’ trust in specialists. 
When specialists have relevant prior experience, auditors are likely to rely more heavily on their 
work when communication is available. However, due to competing arguments, the directional 
effect of communication when specialists do not have relevant experience is undetermined at this 
time. The second set of hypotheses is as follows: 
H2a: Auditor-specialist communication will increase the extent to which auditors rely on 
matched specialists’ advice. 
H2b: Auditor-specialist communication will affect the extent to which auditors rely on 
mismatched specialists’ advice. 
H2c: Auditor-specialist communication indirectly affects auditors’ reliance on 
specialists’ advice through auditors’ trust in specialists. 
H2d: Auditor-specialist communication will increase the extent to which auditors trust 
specialists when specialists have more relevant, or matched, experience.  
H2e: Auditor-specialist communication will affect the extent to which auditors trust 
specialists when specialists have less relevant, or mismatched, experience. 
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FIGURE 2 
 
Conceptual Diagram of Moderated Mediation Analysis for H2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Trust in 
Specialist 
Reliance on 
Specialist 
Advice 
Opportunity to 
Communicate 
Relevance of 
Specialist Prior 
Experience 
18 
 
Time Pressure 
 Another concern regarding auditors’ use of specialists’ work is the effect of time 
pressure
9
 resulting from auditors’ and specialists’ excessive workloads at year-end, which prior 
research notes exacerbates the communication problems previously discussed (Griffith 2014).  
 Psychology research generally indicates that time pressure is detrimental to task 
performance due to increased psychological stress (Low and Tan 2011), which was also the 
predominant view in much accounting literature. For example, prior accounting studies show that 
audit quality declines as time pressure escalates (see DeZoort 1998). Because auditors have 
limited time to complete year-end procedures, they likely use filtration as a coping mechanism, 
which causes them to focus on key audit areas and only consider the most important information 
(Sevenson and Edland 1987; Glover 1997). Although this strategy increases audit efficiency, it 
can also lead to lower audit quality if relevant information is mistakenly ignored. Studies show 
that elevated time pressure can hurt audit effectiveness by reducing the time spent reviewing 
pertinent information (McDaniel 1990; Arnold, Sutton, Hayne, and Smith 2000) and causing 
auditors to accept weaker audit evidence and prematurely sign-off on audit procedures (Kelley 
and Margheim 1990; Glover 1997). 
Alternatively, several accounting researchers have documented various benefits of time 
pressure, such as increased task focus, motivation, efficiency, and job satisfaction (see DeZoort 
1998), thus refuting the view that time pressure is always bad. Spilker (1995) finds that time 
pressure positively affects tax researchers’ performance when they have relevant prior 
experience, and Spilker and Prawitt’s (1997) extension, which further investigates the interaction 
                                                          
9
 Time pressure literature has two distinct classifications, time budget pressure, which involves allotted amounts of 
time allowed to complete each task, and time deadline pressure, which arises from specific points in time set for task 
completion (DeZoort and Lord 1997; DeZoort 1998). Most prior research examines time budget pressure, whereas 
the focus of this paper is time deadline pressure (henceforth referred to solely as “time pressure” for simplicity).  
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between time pressure and expertise, concludes that acquired knowledge enables decision 
makers to better identify and encode important information in an efficient manner when facing 
time pressure.  
Considering the potential for both positive and negative effects, many now describe the 
relationship between time pressure and performance as an inverted-U function, in which 
performance is initially low because low stress allows individuals to attend to many cues, 
including those that are irrelevant. Then, as stress rises, individuals’ attention improves and they 
focus more on relevant information. At a certain point, however, the stress becomes 
overwhelming and even relevant material is disregarded, resulting in diminished performance 
(Easterbrook 1959; Choo 1995; Spilker 1995; DeZoort and Lord 1997). Because auditors face 
extreme time pressure at year-end, it is likely they fall at the far end of the inverted-U function 
where performance is suboptimal due to excessive stress. Furthermore, because prior research 
provides evidence that auditors accept weaker audit evidence when facing time pressure, I expect 
additional time pressure to negatively affect audit quality by increasing auditors’ reliance on 
specialists’ work, even in the case of specialist mismatch.  
Based on H1, auditors are expected to rely more on matched specialists’ work, so greater 
time pressure may still increase the extent of reliance, but it is likely to result in a smaller change 
because there is less room for growth, as they are already relying so heavily. On the other hand, 
H1 predicts that auditors will rely less on mismatched specialists’ work, so there is more room 
for growth. Therefore, increased time pressure is expected to have a greater positive effect on 
auditors’ reliance on specialists’ work when the specialist is mismatched. The third hypothesis is 
as follows: 
20 
 
H3: Time pressure will have a more positive effect on auditors’ reliance on specialists’ 
advice when specialists have less relevant, or mismatched, experience compared to more 
relevant, or matched, experience. 
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IV. METHODOLOGY 
Setting 
To examine the underlying theory, this study applies experimental economics methods 
(Friedman and Sunder 1994) using an abstract, cooperative game in a controlled laboratory 
setting analogous to the audit setting of interest but excluding audit-specific context. Participants 
are randomly assigned to either the auditor or specialist role
10
 and work together in pairs on an 
estimation task that corresponds to fair value measurements. To provide real economic 
incentives, students are paid a $5 participation fee and have the opportunity to earn additional 
compensation based on their judgments. A $10 prize is awarded each round to the pair with the 
most accurate final estimates, giving $5 to each winning participant. There are 20 rounds 
altogether, so each participant has the opportunity to earn between $5 and $105 in total. 
Participants 
The populations of interest are all professional financial auditors and valuation specialists 
in the United States. However, because my setting is simple and abstract, it is not necessary that 
participants have auditing knowledge and experience. Therefore, consistent with experimental 
economics literature (Friedman and Sunder 1994; Kachelmeier and King 2002) and the advice of 
Libby, Bloomfield, and Nelson (2002), the participants consist of college students rather than 
practitioners. I recruited participants for my experimental sessions from accounting classes at the 
University of Mississippi. All volunteers at least 18 years old were accepted into the study. As an 
                                                          
10
 To maintain an abstract setting, the participant materials use generic language. “Guesser” and “Estimator” 
correspond to the auditor and specialist roles, respectively. 
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additional note, the university’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviewed and approved this 
study before I started any data collection. 
Procedures 
The experiment was conducted using z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007), which 
randomly assigned participants as either the auditor or specialist.
11
 Written instructions 
describing the setting and each player’s role were given to participants, which I also read aloud 
at the beginning of the session.
12
 Those assigned as the specialist then completed 20 training 
rounds. During each training round, each specialist viewed a picture on the computer of a 
container, which changed each round, filled with either gumballs or kernels of corn (see design 
section below), entered an estimate of the amount, and then learned the correct amount. By 
receiving feedback after each round, the specialists were able to refine their estimation process 
and improve decision accuracy (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006), thus developing expertise.
13
  
To accommodate auditors while specialists were training, they each received a packet 
that contained a crossword puzzle, word searches, and a Sudoku puzzle, which they were able to 
work on while they waited. They were instructed that these activities were completely optional, 
unrelated to the experiment, and did not affect their earnings. 
Once training was complete, the compensation rounds began, at which time z-Tree 
randomly paired each auditor with one specialist. These pairings remained unchanged for all 20 
rounds. At the beginning of each round, participants viewed a picture of a container, which 
changed each round, filled with gumballs, and both the auditor and specialist submitted an initial 
estimate. Depending on the experimental condition, the auditor and specialist were then either 
                                                          
11
 Appendix B provides screenshots of z-Tree for both the auditor and specialist roles. 
12
 Appendix A provides the written instructions that were read aloud. A bulleted, outline version was given to 
participants to follow along. 
13
 The participant instructions emphasize that participant earnings are not determined by the training rounds. 
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allowed to chat via z-Tree for 30 seconds or not. Once the chat concluded (if applicable), the 
auditor was notified of the specialist’s estimate. The auditor then submitted a final estimate, thus 
ending the round.
14
 Participants did not receive any feedback during the compensation rounds to 
prevent learning effects. 
After completing all 20 compensation rounds, participants were notified that the 
experiment concluded. They then filled out a post-experimental questionnaire,
15
 which included 
comprehension checks; measures of perceived expertise, trust in their partner, bond with their 
partner, and trait skepticism;
16
 and key demographics. Before leaving, they received their 
participant fee of $5 and any prize money they earned. 
  
                                                          
14
 The procedures implemented in this study follow that of a typical judge-advisor system, during which the judge 
and advisor simultaneously make an initial decision based on equally available information, the judge receives the 
advisor’s recommendation, and then the judge decides how heavily to weigh the advice when making the final 
decision (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006). 
15
 Appendix C provides participants’ post-experimental questionnaire. 
16
 Hurtt (2010) develops a scale to measure trait professional skepticism consisting of six factors: a questioning 
mind, a suspension of judgment, a search for knowledge, interpersonal understanding, self-esteem, and autonomy. 
Because a search for knowledge and interpersonal understanding are not pertinent to this study, those items were 
removed from the post-experimental questionnaire. 
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FIGURE 3 
 
Detailed Procedures of Experiment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
INTRODUCTION 
Participants View Hardcopy Outline of Instructions, while Experimenter Reads Full Version 
Aloud 
Participants Randomly Assigned to Roles of Auditor or Specialist 
TRAINING ROUNDS 
Computer Provides Role-specific Instructions for Training Rounds, then Round 1 Begins 
Specialist Views Picture of Gumballs (Corn) and Enters 
Estimate of Number of Gumballs (Weight of Corn) 
While Still Viewing Picture, Specialist is Reminded of 
Their Estimate and Learns Correct Amount 
Auditor Waits for Specialist to 
Train (Has Option to Work on 
Various Games/Puzzles) 
After 20 Rounds, Computer Announces End of Training Rounds 
COMPENSATION ROUNDS 
Auditor-Specialist Pairs are Randomly Assigned (Remain Partners for All 20 Rounds) 
Computer Provides Role-specific Instructions for Compensation Rounds, then Round 1 Begins 
Participants View Picture of Gumballs and Enter an Estimate (Have Time Limit of Either 5 or 20 
Seconds, where First 10 Rounds and Last 10 Rounds are Counterbalanced) 
In Chat Condition, Auditor and Specialist Have 
Opportunity to Chat for 30 Seconds via z-Tree 
In No Chat Condition, Auditor and 
Specialist View Wait Screen for 30 Seconds 
Auditor Learns Specialist’s Estimate 
Auditor Enters Final Estimate (Have Same Time Limit as with Pre-Chat Estimate) 
After 20 Rounds, Computer Announces End of Compensation Rounds 
CONCLUSION 
Participants Fill Out Post-Experimental Questionnaire and Receive Payment 
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Design 
This experiment uses a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed design. The first independent variable, specialist 
experience, is manipulated between-subjects at two levels. In the Matched condition, specialists 
train by estimating the number of gumballs in various containers, while those in the Mismatched 
condition train by estimating the weight of corn. Although both groups of specialists gain some 
form of estimation experience, those in the Matched condition gain directly relevant experience 
because the actual experimental task in all conditions is estimating the number of gumballs, 
whereas those in the Mismatched condition do not. Therefore, only specialists’ in the Matched 
condition gain relevant expertise for auditors’ assigned task. 
The second independent variable, communication, is also manipulated between-subjects 
at two levels, where auditor-specialist pairs in the Chat condition are able to communicate during 
the experiment through an online z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) chat box, while auditor-specialist 
pairs in the No Chat condition are not. In the Chat condition, participants are able to 
communicate with their partner for 30 seconds after making their initial estimates but before the 
auditors make their final estimates. To maintain ceteris paribus conditions, those in the No Chat 
condition also wait 30 seconds between the initial and final estimates, but they have a “wait 
screen” instead of a chat box available. After the 30 seconds, the specialist’s initial estimate is 
revealed to the auditor before he/she enters the final estimate. 
The third independent variable, time pressure, is a within-subjects variable and is 
manipulated by allotting auditors either 5 seconds or 20 seconds to submit each estimate during 
the round. Following Spilker (1995), I conducted a pilot study approved by the university’s IRB 
to determine the appropriate length of time to give participants for each level of time pressure. 
The results of the pilot indicated that 20 seconds induces low time pressure by providing 
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participants enough time to comfortably make an estimate without feeling rushed but not having 
excess time left over, whereas 5 seconds induces high time pressure by providing participants 
with the minimum time necessary to make an estimate. To avoid potential order effects of this 
within-subjects variable, I counterbalanced the time limits such that half of the participants faced 
the 5 (20) second time limit during the first 10 compensation rounds and the 20 (5) second time 
limit during the last 10 rounds. 
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V. RESULTS 
Manipulation Checks 
 In the post-experimental questionnaire, participants were asked to identify whether the 
tasks for the training and compensation rounds were the same, which was to estimate the number 
of gumballs. Most participants (84%) answered the manipulation check correctly based on their 
assigned specialist experience condition (answered “true” for matched condition and “false” for 
mismatched condition). However, those who failed the manipulation check were eliminated from 
the sample because I am unable to disentangle whether they misunderstood the training task 
and/or the compensation task, the proper understanding of which is vital for my analysis. 
Tests of H1 
H1a states that auditors will rely more heavily on specialists' advice when specialists 
have more relevant, or matched, experience than when they have mismatched experience. Table 
1, Panel A lists the means and standard deviations for key variables across all independent 
variables, which provides support for my prediction for H1a. Reliance on specialist is measured 
as the proportion of the distance between the auditor’s initial estimate and the specialist’s advice 
that the auditor’s final estimate adjusts,17 thus demonstrating the extent to which auditors utilize 
specialists’ advice when making their final decision (Kadous et al. 2013). For between-subjects 
factors (specialist experience and communication), reliance on specialist is averaged over all 
                                                          
17
 Reliance on specialist = (auditor final estimate– auditor initial estimate) / (specialist advice – auditor initial 
estimate). This definition follows Kadous et al. (2013), excluding absolute values due to potential interest in 
directional movement. Because reliance on specialists is an unbounded dependent variable, outliers were winsorized 
at the top and bottom three percent. As a robustness check, reliance on specialists was also rank ordered; results 
were statistically unchanged. 
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available rounds for each participant, resulting in one observation per participant. For the within-
subjects factor (time pressure), reliance on specialist is averaged over all available rounds for 
each participant within each time pressure condition, usually resulting in two observations per 
participant.
18
 Per Table 1, Panel A, auditors in the matched condition rely more heavily on 
specialists’ advice (mean = 62.03%) than auditors in the mismatched condition (mean = 
47.45%). 
  
                                                          
18
 During each round, participants who exceeded the time limit were not able to submit an estimate. Participants who 
did not submit an estimate for at least half of the rounds per time pressure condition were excluded from the sample 
for that respective time pressure condition. Thus, not all participants are present in both time pressure conditions. 
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TABLE 1 
Means (Standard Deviations) by Experimental Condition 
Panel A: By Independent Variable 
 
Specialist Experience
a
 
 
Communication
b
 
 
Time Pressure
c
 
 
Match Mismatch 
 
Chat No Chat 
 
High Low 
n n = 26 n = 22 n = 24 n = 24 n = 43 n = 48 
Reliance on 
Specialist 
62.03% 47.45% 
 
60.52% 50.17% 
 
56.42% 54.53% 
(24.74%) (30.62%) (20.13%) (34.20%) (29.81%) (28.18%) 
Professional 
Skepticism 
72.31 72.86 
 
71.24 73.89 
 
72.82 72.56 
(6.92) (8.47) (7.90) (7.19) (7.96) (7.59) 
Perceived 
Specialist 
Expertise 
4.19 2.77 
 
4.17 2.92 
 
3.63 3.54 
(1.67) (1.19) (1.27) (1.72) (1.68) (1.62) 
Trust in 
Specialist 
5.04 4.64 
 
5.79 3.92 
 
4.95 4.85 
(1.84) (2.30) (1.50) (2.12) (1.96) (2.05) 
Bond with 
Specialist 
3.08 3.45 
 
4.83 1.67 
 
3.14 3.25 
(2.08) (2.28) (1.81) (1.01) (2.09) (2.16) 
Estimation 
Error 
-12.16% -72.53% 
 
-33.82% -45.84% 
 
-38.26% -40.89% 
(27.49%) (11.61%) (42.77%) (30.47%) (38.93%) (35.89%) 
 
Panel B: Specialist Experience
a
 x Communication
b
 
 
Match 
 
Mismatch 
 
 
Chat No Chat 
 
Chat No Chat 
 n n = 14 n = 12 n = 10 n = 12 
Reliance on 
Specialist 
68.73% 54.21% 
 
49.04% 46.13% 
 (16.60%) (30.68%) (19.66%) (38.33%) 
Professional 
Skepticism 
70.52 74.40 
 
72.26 73.37 
 (6.22) (7.36) (10.08) (7.31) 
Perceived 
Specialist 
Expertise 
4.86 3.42 
 
3.20 2.42 
 (0.95) (2.02) (1.03) (1.24) 
Trust in 
Specialist 
5.93 4.00 
 
5.60 3.83 
 (1.21) (1.95) (1.90) (2.37) 
Bond with 
Specialist 
4.36 1.58 
 
5.50 1.75 
 (1.95) (0.90) (1.43) (1.14) 
Estimation 
Error 
-3.80% -21.91% 
 
-75.85% -69.78% 
 (28.26%) (24.11%) (12.52%) (10.53%) 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Specialist Experience
a
 x Time Pressure
c 
 
Match 
 
Mismatch 
 
 
High Low 
 
High Low 
 n n = 24 n = 26 n = 19 n = 22 
Reliance on 
Specialist 
61.53% 62.18% 
 
49.97% 45.49% 
 (24.98%) (25.80%) (34.61%) (28.76%) 
Professional 
Skepticism 
72.57 72.31 
 
73.13 72.86 
 (7.12) (6.92) (9.12) (8.47) 
Perceived 
Specialist 
Expertise 
4.29 4.19 
 
2.79 2.77 
 (1.68) (1.67) (1.27) (1.19) 
Trust in 
Specialist 
5.13 5.04 
 
4.74 4.64 
 (1.68) (1.84) (2.31) (2.30) 
Bond with 
Specialist 
3.00 3.08 
 
3.32 3.45 
 (1.96) (2.08) (2.29) (2.28) 
Estimation 
Error 
-10.86% -14.49% 
 
-72.86% -72.08% 
 (29.99%) (26.57%) (10.99%) (12.66%) 
 
          a Auditors assigned to the matched (mismatched) condition were randomly paired with a 
specialist who was trained by estimating the number of gumballs (weight of corn) prior to the 
partnered compensation rounds. 
 
b 
Auditors assigned to the chat (no chat) condition were (not) able to communicate with their 
partner through an online z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) chat box during the compensation rounds. 
 
c
 Time pressure was manipulated as a within-subjects variable. When high (low) time pressure 
was present, auditors had 5 (20) seconds to submit each estimate. 
 
Variable definitions:           
 
Reliance on specialists = the proportion of the distance between the auditor’s initial guess and 
the specialist’s estimate that the auditor’s final guess adjusts. 
 
Professional Skepticism was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Each auditors' 
professional skepticism score was calculated based on 19 items from the Hurtt (2010) trait 
skepticism scale (two of the six factors were excluded due to lack of relevance) using a seven-
point Likert scale. The scale was transformed to a 100-point scale by dividing the individual's 
score by 133.  
 
Perceived Specialist Expertise was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. 
Auditors assessed their partner's relevant expertise to complete the estimation task using a 
seven-point Likert scale. 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
 
Trust in Specialist was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Auditors assessed 
their overall trust in their partner using a seven-point Likert scale. 
 
Bond with Specialist was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Auditors assessed 
their development of a bond with their partner using a seven-point Likert scale. 
 
Estimation error = the percentage difference between the auditor's final estimate and the 
correct amount. 
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To formally test my hypotheses, I employ a repeated-measures Analysis of Covariance 
(ANCOVA) model shown in Table 2, Panel A. The dependent variable is reliance on specialist 
and the independent variables are specialist experience, communication, and time pressure, 
which are coded as either “1” or “0” for matched versus mismatched experience, chat versus no 
chat, and high versus low time pressure, respectively. I also include auditors’ professional 
skepticism as a covariate, which was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire.
19
 The 
ANCOVA model in Table 2, Panel A demonstrates that specialist experience significantly 
affects reliance on specialist (F = 5.12, p = 0.029) in the predicted direction such that auditors 
rely more heavily on advice from matched than mismatched specialists, thus supporting H1a. 
  
                                                          
19
 Professional skepticism was calculated based on participants’ responses to 19 items from the Hurtt (2010) trait 
skepticism scale (two of the six factors were excluded due to lack of relevance for this study) using a seven-point 
Likert scale. The scale was transformed to a 100-point scale by dividing the individual's total score by 133. 
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TABLE 2 
Effects of Specialist Experience
a
, Communication
b
, and Time Pressure
c
                                                                              
on Reliance on Specialist
d
 
Panel A: ANCOVA 
         
Source 
 
num 
df 
 
denom 
df 
 
F-
test 
 
p-
value
e
 
 Specialist Experience 
 
1 
 
43 
 
5.12 
 
0.029 ** 
Communication 
 
1 
 
43 
 
4.04 
 
0.051 * 
Time Pressure 
 
1 
 
39 
 
0.13 
 
0.721 
 Specialist Experience*Communication 
 
1 
 
43 
 
0.50 
 
0.483 
 Specialist Experience*Time Pressure 
 
1 
 
39 
 
0.25 
 
0.619 
 Communication*Time Pressure 
 
1 
 
39 
 
0.09 
 
0.767 
 Specialist Experience*Communication*Time Pressure 
 
1 
 
39 
 
0.23 
 
0.636 
 Professional Skepticism
f
 
 
1 
 
43 
 
4.75 
 
0.035 ** 
           
Panel B: Pairwise Contrasts 
         
Source 
 
num 
df 
 
denom 
df 
 
F-
test 
 
p-
value
e
 
 Effect of Specialist Experience under No Chat 
 
1 
 
82 
 
1.24 
 
0.269 
 Effect of Specialist Experience under Chat 
 
1 
 
82 
 
4.24 
 
0.043 ** 
Effect of Communication under Mismatched 
 
1 
 
82 
 
0.80 
 
0.375 
 Effect of Communication under Matched 
 
1 
 
82 
 
4.06 
 
0.047 ** 
Effect of Specialist Experience under Low Pressure 
 
1 
 
82 
 
4.08 
 
0.047 ** 
Effect of Specialist Experience under High Pressure 
 
1 
 
82 
 
1.46 
 
0.231 
            
Panel C: Planned Contrast
g
 
         
Source 
 
num 
df 
 
denom 
df 
 
F-
test 
 
p-
value
e
 
 Specialist Experience*Time Pressure 
 
1 
 
82 
 
5.61 
 
0.020 ** 
  
         a Auditors assigned to the matched (mismatched) condition were randomly paired with a 
specialist who was trained by estimating the number of gumballs (weight of corn) prior to the 
partnered compensation rounds. 
 b Auditors assigned to the chat (no chat) condition were (not) able to communicate with their 
partner through an online z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) chat box during the compensation 
rounds. 
 c Time pressure was manipulated as a within-subjects variable. When high (low) time 
pressure was present, auditors had 5 (20) seconds to submit each estimate. 
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TABLE 2 (continued) 
 
d 
Reliance on specialists = the proportion of the distance between the auditor’s initial guess 
and the specialist’s estimate that the auditor’s final guess adjusts. 
 e  *,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 f Professional Skepticism is a covariate obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. 
Each auditors' professional skepticism score was calculated based on 19 items from the Hurtt 
(2010) trait skepticism scale (two of the six factors were excluded due to lack of relevance) 
using a seven-point Likert scale. The scale was transformed to a 100-point scale by dividing 
the individual's score by 133.  
 g Weights: -3 for Mismatched, Low Pressure; -1 for Mismatched, High Pressure; +2 for 
Matched, Low Pressure; +2 for Matched, High Pressure 
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Serial Mediation Analysis 
To more fully evaluate the underlying process of auditors’ reliance on specialist advice, 
H1b examines the indirect effects of specialist experience on auditors’ reliance on specialist as 
mediated through auditors’ perceived specialist expertise and subsequent trust in specialist. 
Measures for both mediators were obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire.
20
 Figure 4 
depicts the statistical diagram and Table 3 provides detailed results of the serial mediation 
analysis, for which I utilized Preacher and Hayes (2004)’s bootstrapping method. The mediation 
results demonstrate that specialist experience significantly affects auditors’ perceived specialist 
expertise (t = 3.33, p = 0.002), auditors’ perceived specialist expertise significantly affects 
auditors’ trust in specialist (t = 3.66, p = 0.001), and auditors’ trust in specialist significantly 
affects auditors’ reliance on specialist (t = 4.03, p < 0.001), thus supporting H1b.  
  
                                                          
20
 Perceived specialist expertise was determined by the post-experimental question, “My partner has relevant 
expertise to complete the estimation task”, which was rated on a seven-point Likert scale. Trust in specialist was 
determined by the reverse score of the post-experimental question, “I did not trust my partner”, which was also rated 
on a seven-point Likert scale. 
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FIGURE 4 
 
Statistical Diagram of Serial Mediation Analysis for H1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
Perceived 
Specialist 
Expertise 
Reliance on 
Specialist 
Advice 
Relevance of 
Specialist 
Prior 
Experience 
Trust in 
Specialist 
t = 3.66, p = 0.001 
t = 0.45, p = 0.652 
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TABLE 3 
Serial Mediation: Effect of Specialist Experience
a
 on Reliance on Specialist
b                                                                                                                                                                             
 
through Perceived Specialist Expertise
c 
and Trust in Specialist
d
  (H1) 
Panel A: Regression Model of Perceived Specialist Expertise 
  
Coefficient 
 
SE 
 
t-stat 
 
p-value 
 Specialist Experience 
 
1.42 
 
0.43 
 
3.33 
 
0.002 *** 
          Panel B: Regression Model of Trust in Specialist 
  
Coefficient 
 
SE 
 
t-stat 
 
p-value 
 Specialist Experience 
 
-0.55 
 
0.59 
 
-0.93 
 
0.357 
 Perceived Specialist Expertise 
 
0.67 
 
0.18 
 
3.66 
 
0.001 *** 
          Panel C: Regression Model of Reliance on Specialist 
  
Coefficient 
 
SE 
 
t-stat 
 
p-value 
 Specialist Experience 
 
0.03 
 
0.06 
 
0.45 
 
0.652 
 Perceived Specialist Expertise 
 
0.06 
 
0.02 
 
2.83 
 
0.007 *** 
Trust in Specialist 
 
0.06 
 
0.02 
 
4.03 
 
<.001 *** 
          Panel D: Serial Indirect Effects of Specialist Experience
f
 
 Path        
 
Effect 
 
SE 
 
LLCI 
 
ULCI 
 Total 
 
0.12 
 
0.06 
 
0.004 
 
0.254 
 Ind1 
 
0.09 
 
0.03 
 
0.037 
 
0.176 
 Ind2 
 
0.06 
 
0.03 
 
0.021 
 
0.141 
 Ind3 
 
-0.04 
 
0.04 
 
-0.122 
 
0.024 
   
         a Auditors assigned to the matched (mismatched) condition were randomly paired with a 
specialist who was trained by estimating the number of gumballs (weight of corn) prior to the 
partnered compensation rounds. 
 
b
Reliance on specialists = the proportion of the distance between the auditor’s initial guess and 
the specialist’s estimate that the auditor’s final guess adjusts. 
 
c 
Perceived Specialist Expertise was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. 
Auditors assessed their partner's relevant expertise to complete the estimation task using a 
seven-point Likert scale. 
 
d 
Trust in Specialist was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Auditors assessed 
their overall trust in their partner using a seven-point Likert scale. 
 
e  
*,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 3 (continued) 
 
f 
Panel D reports the 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals based on 5,000 
bootstrap samples for the serial indirect effects based on the technique described in Hayes 
(2013). Total represents the total indirect effect of Specialist Experience on Reliance on 
Specialist through all specific indirect paths. Ind1 represents the indirect path from Specialist 
Experience to Perceived Specialist Expertise to Reliance on Specialist. Ind2 represents the 
indirect path from Specialist Experience to Perceived Specialist Expertise to Trust in Specialist 
to Reliance on Specialist. Ind3 represents the indirect path from Specialist Experience to Trust 
in Specialist to Reliance on Specialist. 
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Tests of H2 
H2a and H2b predict the effect of communication, moderated by specialist experience, on 
reliance on specialist. Table 1, Panel B describes the means and standard deviations for key 
variables for the two-way interaction of specialist experience and communication, and the 
respective means for reliance on specialist are plotted in Figure 5. Results suggest a main effect 
of specialist experience such that auditors rely more heavily on specialists’ advice in the matched 
versus mismatched condition regardless of communication (matched and chat- 68.73%, matched 
and no chat- 54.21% versus mismatched and chat- 49.04%, mismatched and no chat- 46.13%) 
and a possible main effect of communication. As a formal test, the ANCOVA model in Table 2, 
Panel A confirms a significant main effect of communication on auditors’ reliance on specialist 
(F = 4.04, p = 0.051).  
The interaction in the ANCOVA model between specialist experience and 
communication in Table 2, Panel A, however, is not significant (F = 0.50, p = 0.483), prompting 
further evaluation. Table 2, Panel B provides the results of pairwise comparisons for the simple 
effects of specialist experience and communication, which indicate that the relevance of 
specialists’ prior experience (matched versus mismatched) only significantly affects auditors’ 
reliance on specialists when communication between auditors and specialists is available (F = 
4.24, p = 0.043) and that the opportunity to communicate (chat versus no chat) only significantly 
affects auditors’ reliance on specialists when specialists have relevant prior experience (F = 4.06, 
p = 0.047), which follows the predicted relationship in H2a but not H2b.  
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FIGURE 5 
 
Effects of Specialist Experience and Communication on Reliance on Specialist 
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Mediation and Moderated Mediation Analyses 
 H2c, H2d, and H2e examine the indirect effect of communication, moderated by 
specialist experience, on auditors’ reliance on specialist as mediated through auditors’ trust in 
specialist. Figure 6 and Figure 7 depict the statistical diagrams for the mediation and moderated 
mediation analyses, respectively. Table 4 and Table 5 provide detailed results of the mediation 
and moderated mediation analyses, respectively, for which I utilized Preacher and Hayes 
(2004)’s bootstrapping method. The mediation analysis results demonstrate that communication 
significantly affects auditors’ trust in specialist (t = 3.53, p = 0.001), and auditors’ trust in 
specialist significantly affects auditors’ reliance on specialist (t = 5.67, p < 0.001), thus 
supporting H2c. However, per the moderated mediation analysis, specialist experience and the 
interaction of communication and specialist experience do not have a significant effect on trust 
in specialist (t = 0.22, p = 0.829 and t = 0.15, p = 0.883, respectively) or reliance on specialist (t 
= 0.75, p = 0.458 and t = 0.82, p = 0.419, respectively) in the model, thus failing to support H2d 
and H2e. 
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FIGURE 6 
 
Statistical Diagram of Mediation Analysis for H2 
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TABLE 4 
Mediation: Effect of Communication
a
 on Reliance on Specialist
b
                                                                                                      
through Trust in Specialist
c
 (H2) 
Panel A: Regression Model of Trust in Specialist 
  
Coefficient 
 
SE 
 
t-stat 
 
p-value
d
 
 Communication 
 
1.88 
 
0.53 
 
3.53 
 
0.001 ** 
          Panel B: Regression Model of Reliance on Specialist 
  
Coefficient 
 
SE 
 
t-stat 
 
p-value 
 Communication 
 
-0.08 
 
0.07 
 
-1.15 
 
0.256 
 Trust in Specialist 
 
0.10 
 
0.02 
 
5.67 
 
<.001 *** 
          Panel C: Indirect Effect of Communication
e
 
Mediator             
 
Effect 
 
SE 
 
LLCI 
 
ULCI 
 Trust in Specialist 
 
0.18 
 
0.06 
 
0.082 
 
0.329 
 
            
         a Auditors assigned to the chat (no chat) condition were (not) able to communicate with their 
partner through an online z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) chat box during the compensation rounds. 
 
b 
Reliance on specialists = the proportion of the distance between the auditor’s initial guess and 
the specialist’s estimate that the auditor’s final guess adjusts. 
 
c 
Trust in Specialist was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Auditors assessed 
their overall trust in their partner using a seven-point Likert scale. 
 
d  
*,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
 
e 
Panel C reports the 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval based on 5,000 bootstrap 
samples for the indirect effect of Communication on Reliance on Specialist through Trust in 
Specialist based on the technique described in Hayes (2013). 
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FIGURE 7 
 
Statistical Diagram of Moderated Mediation Analysis for H2 
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TABLE 5 
Moderated Mediation: Effect of Communication
a
 on Reliance on Specialist
b
                                                                                                      
through Trust in Specialist
c
, moderated by Specialist Experience
d
 (H2) 
Panel A: Regression Model of Trust in Specialist 
  
Coefficient 
 
SE 
 
t-stat 
 
p-value
e
 
 Communication 
 
1.77 
 
0.80 
 
2.20 
 
0.033 ** 
Specialist Experience 
 
0.17 
 
0.77 
 
0.22 
 
0.829 
 Communication*Specialist Experience 
 
0.16 
 
1.09 
 
0.15 
 
0.883 
 
          Panel B: Regression Model of Reliance on Specialist 
  
Coefficient 
 
SE 
 
t-stat 
 
p-value 
 Communication 
 
-0.14 
 
0.10 
 
-1.47 
 
0.149 
 Specialist Experience 
 
0.06 
 
0.09 
 
0.75 
 
0.458 
 Trust in Specialist 
 
0.10 
 
0.02 
 
5.65 
 
<.001 *** 
Communication*Specialist Experience 
 
0.10 
 
0.12 
 
0.82 
 
0.419 
 
          Panel C: Conditional Direct Effects
f
 
Specialist Experience 
 
Effect 
 
SE 
 
t-stat 
 
p-value 
 Matched 
 
-0.04 
 
0.09 
 
-0.45 
 
0.657 
 Mismatched 
 
-0.14 
 
0.10 
 
-1.47 
 
0.149 
 
          Panel D: Conditional Indirect Effects
g
 
Specialist Experience 
 
Effect 
 
SE 
 
LLCI 
 
ULCI 
 Matched 
 
0.19 
 
0.07 
 
0.057 
 
0.323 
 Mismatched 
 
0.17 
 
0.10 
 
-0.005 
 
0.385 
 
          Panel E: Indirect Effect of Highest Order Product
h
 
Mediator             
 
Effect 
 
SE 
 
LLCI 
 
ULCI 
 Trust in Specialist 
 
0.02 
 
0.11 
 
-0.204 
 
0.229 
 
            
         a Auditors assigned to the chat (no chat) condition were (not) able to communicate with their 
partner through an online z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) chat box during the compensation rounds. 
 
b 
Reliance on specialists = the proportion of the distance between the auditor’s initial guess and 
the specialist’s estimate that the auditor’s final guess adjusts. 
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c 
Trust in Specialist was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Auditors assessed 
their overall trust in their partner using a seven-point Likert scale. 
 
d 
Auditors assigned to the matched (mismatched) condition were randomly paired with a 
specialist who was trained by estimating the number of gumballs (weight of corn) prior to the 
partnered compensation rounds. 
 
e  
*,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
 
f 
Panel C presents the direct effect of Communication on Reliance on Specialist conditioned on 
Specialist Experience. 
 
g 
Panel D reports the 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals based on 5,000 bootstrap 
samples for the indirect effects of Communication through Trust in Specialist on Reliance on 
Specialist conditioned on Specialist Experience. 
 
h 
Panel E reports the 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval based on 5,000 bootstrap 
samples for the indirect effect of the highest order product. The moderator, Specialist 
Experience, is dichotomous; thus, this is a test of equality of the conditional indirect effects in 
the two groups (Hayes 2013). 
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Supplemental Mediation Analyses 
 To determine whether communication affects trust in specialist due to the relevance of 
specialists’ expertise and/or a social bond, I conduct two parallel mediation analyses (one for 
each specialist experience condition) that evaluate the indirect effect of communication on trust 
in specialist through both perceived specialist expertise and bond with specialist considered 
simultaneously as mediators. The measure for bond with specialist was obtained from the post-
experimental questionnaire.
21
  
Figure 8, Panel A depicts the statistical diagram and Table 6 provides detailed results of 
the parallel mediation analysis for the matched condition. Results show that, when specialists 
have matched experience, communication significantly affects auditors’ perceived specialist 
expertise (t = 2.38, p = 0.025) and bond with specialist (t = 4.53, p < .001), but only perceived 
specialist expertise significantly affects trust in specialist (t = 3.01, p = 0.007).   
Figure 8, Panel B depicts the statistical diagram and Table 7 provides detailed results of 
the parallel mediation analysis for the mismatched condition. Results show that, when specialists 
are mismatched, communication only has a significant effect on bond with specialist (t = 6.84, p 
< .001), not perceived specialist expertise (t = 1.59, p = 0.128). Furthermore, trust in specialist is 
not significantly affected by communication (t = 1.56, p = 0.135), perceived specialist expertise 
(t = 0.83, p = 0.418), or bond with specialist (t = -0.83, p = 0.417). 
  
                                                          
21
 Bond with specialist was determined by the post-experimental question, “I developed a bond with my partner”, 
which was rated on a seven-point Likert scale. 
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FIGURE 8 
 
Parallel Mediation Analysis for Effects on Auditor Trust in Specialist 
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TABLE 6 
Parallel Mediation: Effect of Communication
a 
on Trust in Specialist
b
                                                                                                                
through Perceived Specialist Expertise
c
 and Bond with Specialist
d                                                                                                                                                                                  
(Matched Condition)
e
 
Panel A: Regression Model of Perceived Specialist Expertise 
  
Coefficient 
 
SE 
 
t-stat 
 
p-value
f
 
 Communication 
 
1.44 
 
0.60 
 
2.38 
 
0.025 ** 
          Panel B: Regression Model of Bond with Specialist 
  
Coefficient 
 
SE 
 
t-stat 
 
p-value 
 Communication 
 
2.77 
 
0.61 
 
4.53 
 
<.001 *** 
          Panel C: Regression Model of Trust in Specialist 
  
Coefficient 
 
SE 
 
t-stat 
 
p-value 
 Communication 
 
1.01 
 
0.73 
 
1.38 
 
0.183 
 Perceived Specialist Expertise 
 
0.59 
 
0.20 
 
3.01 
 
0.007 *** 
Bond with Specialist 
 
0.03 
 
0.19 
 
0.14 
 
0.891 
 
          Panel D: Indirect Effects of Communication
g
 
 Path        
 
Effect 
 
SE 
 
LLCI 
 
ULCI 
 Total 
 
0.92 
 
0.64 
 
-0.218 
 
2.312 
 Ind1 
 
0.85 
 
0.41 
 
0.194 
 
1.897 
 Ind2 
 
0.07 
 
0.65 
 
-1.350 
 
1.226 
   
         a Auditors assigned to the chat (no chat) condition were (not) able to communicate with their 
partner through an online z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) chat box during the compensation rounds. 
 
b 
Trust in Specialist was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Auditors assessed 
their overall trust in their partner using a seven-point Likert scale. 
 
c 
Perceived Specialist Expertise was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Auditors 
assessed their partner's relevant expertise to complete the estimation task using a seven-point 
Likert scale. 
 
d 
Bond with Specialist was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Auditors assessed 
their development of a bond with their partner using a seven-point Likert scale. 
 
e 
Auditors assigned to the matched condition were randomly paired with a specialist who was 
trained by estimating the number of gumballs prior to the partnered compensation rounds. 
 
f  
*,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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g 
Panel D reports the 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals based on 5,000 bootstrap 
samples for the indirect effects based on the technique described in Hayes (2013). Total 
represents the total indirect effect of Communication on Trust in Specialist through all specific 
indirect paths. Ind1 represents the indirect path from Communication to Perceived Specialist 
Expertise to Trust in Specialist, and Ind2 represents the indirect path from Communication to 
Bond with Specialist to Trust in Specialist. 
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TABLE 7 
Parallel Mediation: Effect of Communication
a 
on Trust in Specialist
b
                                                                                                                
through Perceived Specialist Expertise
c
 and Bond with Specialist
d                                                                                                                                                                                  
(Mismatched Condition)
e
 
Panel A: Regression Model of Perceived Specialist Expertise 
  
Coefficient 
 
SE 
 
t-stat 
 
p-value
f
 
 Communication 
 
0.78 
 
0.49 
 
1.59 
 
0.128 
 
          Panel B: Regression Model of Bond with Specialist 
  
Coefficient 
 
SE 
 
t-stat 
 
p-value 
 Communication 
 
3.75 
 
0.55 
 
6.84 
 
<.001 *** 
          Panel C: Regression Model of Trust in Specialist 
  
Coefficient 
 
SE 
 
t-stat 
 
p-value 
 Communication 
 
2.72 
 
1.74 
 
1.56 
 
0.135 
 Perceived Specialist Expertise 
 
0.37 
 
0.44 
 
0.83 
 
0.418 
 Bond with Specialist 
 
-0.33 
 
0.40 
 
-0.83 
 
0.417 
 
          Panel D: Indirect Effects of Communication
g
 
Path        
 
Effect 
 
SE 
 
LLCI 
 
ULCI 
 Total 
 
-0.95 
 
1.47 
 
-3.843 
 
1.955 
 Ind1 
 
0.29 
 
0.48 
 
-0.296 
 
1.860 
 Ind2 
 
-1.23 
 
1.51 
 
-4.228 
 
1.694 
   
         a Auditors assigned to the chat (no chat) condition were (not) able to communicate with their 
partner through an online z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) chat box during the compensation rounds. 
 
b 
Trust in Specialist was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Auditors assessed 
their overall trust in their partner using a seven-point Likert scale. 
 
c 
Perceived Specialist Expertise was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Auditors 
assessed their partner's relevant expertise to complete the estimation task using a seven-point 
Likert scale. 
 
d 
Bond with Specialist was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Auditors assessed 
their development of a bond with their partner using a seven-point Likert scale. 
 
e 
Auditors assigned to the mismatched condition were randomly paired with a specialist who was 
trained by estimating the weight of corn prior to the partnered compensation rounds. 
 
f  
*,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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g 
Panel D reports the 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals based on 5,000 bootstrap 
samples for the indirect effects based on the technique described in Hayes (2013). Total 
represents the total indirect effect of Communication on Trust in Specialist through all specific 
indirect paths. Ind1 represents the indirect path from Communication to Perceived Specialist 
Expertise to Trust in Specialist, and Ind2 represents the indirect path from Communication to 
Bond with Specialist to Trust in Specialist. 
 
 
  
53 
 
As an additional test, I conduct the same parallel mediation analyses with reliance on 
specialist as the dependent variable. Figure 9, Panel A depicts the statistical diagram and Table 8 
provides detailed results of the parallel mediation analysis for the matched condition. Results 
show that, when specialists have matched experience, communication significantly affects 
auditors’ perceived specialist expertise (t = 2.38, p = 0.025) and bond with specialist (t = 4.53, p 
< .001), but only perceived specialist expertise significantly affects reliance on specialist (t = 
4.03, p = 0.001).  Figure 9, Panel B depicts the statistical diagram and Table 9 provides detailed 
results of the parallel mediation analysis for the mismatched condition. Results show that, when 
specialists are mismatched, communication only has a significant effect on bond with specialist (t 
= 6.84, p < .001), not perceived specialist expertise (t = 1.59, p = 0.128). However, only 
perceived specialist expertise has a significant effect on reliance on specialist (t = 2.16, p = 
0.045). These findings suggest that auditors generally base their reliance decisions on the 
relevance of specialists’ experience rather than any social bond that develops through 
communication. 
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FIGURE 9 
 
Parallel Mediation Analysis for Effects on Auditor Reliance on Specialist 
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TABLE 8 
Parallel Mediation: Effect of Communication
a 
on Reliance on Specialist
b
                                                                                                                
through Perceived Specialist Expertise
c
 and Bond with Specialist
d                                                                                                                                                                                  
(Matched Condition)
e
 
Panel A: Regression Model of Perceived Specialist Expertise 
  
Coefficient 
 
SE 
 
t-stat 
 
p-value
f
 
 Communication 
 
1.44 
 
0.60 
 
2.38 
 
0.025 ** 
          Panel B: Regression Model of Bond with Specialist 
  
Coefficient 
 
SE 
 
t-stat 
 
p-value 
 Communication 
 
2.77 
 
0.61 
 
4.53 
 
<.001 *** 
          Panel C: Regression Model of Reliance on Specialist 
  
Coefficient 
 
SE 
 
t-stat 
 
p-value 
 Communication 
 
-0.02 
 
0.10 
 
-0.19 
 
0.849 
 Perceived Specialist Expertise 
 
0.11 
 
0.03 
 
4.03 
 
0.001 *** 
Bond with Specialist 
 
0.00 
 
0.03 
 
0.16 
 
0.875 
 
          Panel D: Indirect Effects of Communication
g
 
Path        
 
Effect 
 
SE 
 
LLCI 
 
ULCI 
 Total 
 
0.16 
 
0.10 
 
-0.023 
 
0.387 
 Ind1 
 
0.15 
 
0.08 
 
0.027 
 
0.338 
 Ind2 
 
0.01 
 
0.10 
 
-0.170 
 
0.216 
   
         a Auditors assigned to the chat (no chat) condition were (not) able to communicate with their 
partner through an online z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) chat box during the compensation rounds. 
 
b 
Reliance on specialists = the proportion of the distance between the auditor’s initial guess and 
the specialist’s estimate that the auditor’s final guess adjusts. 
 
c 
Perceived Specialist Expertise was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Auditors 
assessed their partner's relevant expertise to complete the estimation task using a seven-point 
Likert scale. 
 
d 
Bond with Specialist was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Auditors assessed 
their development of a bond with their partner using a seven-point Likert scale. 
 
e 
Auditors assigned to the matched condition were randomly paired with a specialist who was 
trained by estimating the number of gumballs prior to the partnered compensation rounds. 
 
f  
*,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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g 
Panel D reports the 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals based on 5,000 bootstrap 
samples for the indirect effects based on the technique described in Hayes (2013). Total 
represents the total indirect effect of Communication on Reliance on Specialist through all 
specific indirect paths. Ind1 represents the indirect path from Communication to Perceived 
Specialist Expertise to Reliance on Specialist, and Ind2 represents the indirect path from 
Communication to Bond with Specialist to Reliance on Specialist. 
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TABLE 9 
Parallel Mediation: Effect of Communication
a 
on Reliance on Specialist
b
                                                                                                                
through Perceived Specialist Expertise
c
 and Bond with Specialist
d                                                                                                                                                                                  
(Mismatched Condition)
e
 
Panel A: Regression Model of Perceived Specialist Expertise 
  
Coefficient 
 
SE 
 
t-stat 
 
p-value
f
 
 Communication 
 
0.78 
 
0.49 
 
1.59 
 
0.128 
 
          Panel B: Regression Model of Bond with Specialist 
  
Coefficient 
 
SE 
 
t-stat 
 
p-value 
 Communication 
 
3.75 
 
0.55 
 
6.84 
 
<.001 *** 
          Panel C: Regression Model of Reliance on Specialist 
  
Coefficient 
 
SE 
 
t-stat 
 
p-value 
 Communication 
 
0.05 
 
0.23 
 
0.23 
 
0.824 
 Perceived Specialist Expertise 
 
0.13 
 
0.06 
 
2.16 
 
0.045 ** 
Bond with Specialist 
 
-0.03 
 
0.05 
 
-0.62 
 
0.546 
 
          Panel D: Indirect Effects of Communication
g
 
Path        
 
Effect 
 
SE 
 
LLCI 
 
ULCI 
 Total 
 
-0.02 
 
0.15 
 
-0.298 
 
0.280 
 Ind1 
 
0.10 
 
0.08 
 
-0.004 
 
0.338 
 Ind2 
 
-0.12 
 
0.15 
 
-0.398 
 
0.180 
   
         a Auditors assigned to the chat (no chat) condition were (not) able to communicate with their 
partner through an online z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) chat box during the compensation rounds. 
 
b 
Reliance on specialists = the proportion of the distance between the auditor’s initial guess and 
the specialist’s estimate that the auditor’s final guess adjusts. 
 
c 
Perceived Specialist Expertise was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Auditors 
assessed their partner's relevant expertise to complete the estimation task using a seven-point 
Likert scale. 
 
d 
Bond with Specialist was obtained from the post-experimental questionnaire. Auditors assessed 
their development of a bond with their partner using a seven-point Likert scale. 
 
e 
Auditors assigned to the mismatched condition were randomly paired with a specialist who was 
trained by estimating the weight of corn prior to the partnered compensation rounds. 
 
f  
*,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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g 
Panel D reports the 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals based on 5,000 bootstrap 
samples for the indirect effects based on the technique described in Hayes (2013). Total 
represents the total indirect effect of Communication on Reliance on Specialist through all 
specific indirect paths. Ind1 represents the indirect path from Communication to Perceived 
Specialist Expertise to Reliance on Specialist, and Ind2 represents the indirect path from 
Communication to Bond with Specialist to Reliance on Specialist. 
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Tests of H3 
 H3 predicts that time pressure will have a more positive effect on auditors’ reliance on 
specialists when specialists have less relevant, or mismatched, experience compared to more 
relevant, or matched, experience due to a potential ceiling effect in the matched condition. Table 
1, Panel C describes the means and standard deviations for key variables for the two-way 
interaction of specialist experience and time pressure, and the respective means for reliance on 
specialist are plotted in Figure 10. Results suggest a main effect of specialist experience such 
that auditors rely more heavily on specialists’ advice in the matched versus mismatched 
condition regardless of time pressure. When specialists have matched experience, auditor 
reliance is 62.18% and 61.53% in low and high time pressure conditions, respectively. On the 
other hand, when specialists have mismatched experience, auditor reliance drops to 45.49% and 
49.97% in low and high time pressure conditions, respectively. This pattern of means is 
consistent with the predicted trend. 
To formally test H3, I performed a planned contrast of cell means
22
 shown in Table 2, 
Panel C. Due to the expected shape, I assigned a contrast weight of -3 for Mismatched, Low 
Pressure; -1 for Mismatched, High Pressure; +2 for Matched, Low Pressure; and +2 for Matched, 
High Pressure. Results in Table 2, Panel C demonstrate a significant interaction between 
specialist experience and time pressure regarding auditors’ reliance on specialists (F = 5.61, p = 
0.020), thus supporting H3. This is consistent with the pairwise comparisons for specialist 
experience under low and high time pressure in Table 2, Panel B, which indicate that the 
relevance of specialists’ prior experience (matched versus mismatched) only significantly affects 
auditors’ reliance on specialists when there is low time pressure (F = 4.08, p = 0.047), not when 
                                                          
22
 I predict an ordinal interaction between specialist experience and time pressure, making the ANCOVA model an 
inappropriate method of analysis (Buckless and Ravenscroft 1990). 
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there is high time pressure (F = 1.46, p = 0.231). Because auditors often face time constraints, 
this finding has important practical implications for audit quality.  
61 
 
FIGURE 10 
 
Effects of Specialist Experience and Time Pressure on Reliance on Specialist 
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Additional Analysis 
I also evaluate the effect of specialist experience and communication on auditors’ 
estimation accuracy by using estimation error as the dependent variable, which is measured as 
the percentage difference between the auditor's final estimate and the correct amount.
23
 
Estimation error is averaged over all available rounds for each participant, resulting in one 
observation per participant.
24
 The means of estimation error for the two-way interaction of 
specialist experience and communication are shown in Table 1, Panel B as well as Figure 11, and 
Table 10 includes the ANOVA model with estimation error as the dependent variable and 
specialist experience and communication as the independent variables. Results in Table 10 
demonstrate a significant main effect of specialist experience (F = 96.44, p < 0.001), indicating 
that auditors are more accurate in the matched versus mismatched condition, as well as a 
significant interaction effect between specialist experience and communication (F = 3.92, p = 
0.054). Per Figure 11, auditors in the matched condition are more accurate when able to 
communicate versus not, which is not surprising. Interestingly, though, auditors in the 
mismatched condition are less accurate when able to communicate versus not, which has 
important practical implications. 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
23
 Estimation error = (auditor's final estimate - correct amount) / correct amount. 
24
 Results for the ANOVA model in Table10 are statistically unaffected by including time pressure. 
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FIGURE 11 
 
Effects of Specialist Experience and Communication on Final Estimation Error 
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TABLE 10 
Effects of Specialist Experience
a
 and Communication
b
                                                                                                                  
on Final Estimation Error
c
 
Source
d
 
 
num 
df 
 
denom 
df 
 
F-test 
 
p-value
e
 
 Specialist Experience 
 
1 
 
44 
 
96.44 
 
<.001 *** 
Communication 
 
1 
 
44 
 
0.97 
 
0.330 
 Specialist Experience*Communication 
 
1 
 
44 
 
3.92 
 
0.054 * 
  
         a Auditors assigned to the matched (mismatched) condition were randomly paired with a 
specialist who was trained by estimating the number of gumballs (weight of corn) prior to 
the partnered compensation rounds. 
 
 
b 
Auditors assigned to the chat (no chat) condition were (not) able to communicate with 
their partner through an online z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) chat box during the 
compensation rounds. 
 
 
c 
Final estimation error = the percentage difference between the auditor's final estimate 
and the correct amount. 
 
 
d 
Time pressure was collapsed for additional analysis. Including time pressure in the model 
does not significantly alter any results. 
 
 
e  
*,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study is to investigate if and how auditors’ reliance on specialists’ 
valuation of complex estimates is affected by specialists’ expertise, auditor-specialist 
communication, and time pressure. I explore this question with a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed experimental 
design by manipulating the relevance of specialists’ prior experience for the current valuation 
task (matched versus mismatched), the opportunity for pairs to communicate (chat versus no 
chat), and the level of time pressure (high versus low). In the experiment, students assigned to 
the role of auditor estimate the number of gumballs in a container for 20 rounds. Each round, 
before making their final estimate, they receive advice from their partner, a student assigned to 
the role of specialist who received prior estimation training. 
In my first set of hypotheses, I evaluate the relationship between the relevance of 
specialists’ prior experience and auditors’ reliance on specialists’ work. I predict and find that 
auditors rely more heavily on advice from specialists with more relevant prior experience 
compared to those with less relevant prior experience. By conducting a serial mediation analysis, 
I determine that the relevance of specialists’ prior experience affects auditors’ perception of 
specialists’ expertise, which influences auditors’ trust in specialists, ultimately affecting auditors’ 
reliance in specialists’ advice. 
In my second set of hypotheses, I investigate auditor-specialist communication. I expect 
the opportunity for auditors and specialists to communicate, moderated by the relevance of 
specialists’ experience, to influence auditors’ reliance on specialists’ advice. I find that both the 
opportunity to communicate and the relevance of specialists’ experience have significant main 
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effects on auditors’ reliance on specialists, although I fail to find a significant interaction 
between the two. However, a moderated mediation analysis indicates that the opportunity to 
communicate increases auditors’ trust in specialists, which increases their reliance on specialists’ 
advice. Upon further examination, I find that, in the matched condition, communication causes 
auditors to perceive specialists as more expert as well as increase their bond with the specialist, 
but it is the perceived expertise that ultimately increases auditors' reliance on specialists, not the 
bond. In the mismatched condition, communication only influences auditors’ bond with 
specialists, not the perceived specialist expertise, and it is perceived expertise that solely 
influences auditors' reliance on specialists. 
My final hypothesis addresses time pressure. By performing a planned contrast of cell 
means, I demonstrate a significant interaction between the relevance of specialists’ prior 
experience and time pressure. Results are consistent with the predicted trend that auditors’ 
reliance on specialists increases as time pressure increases under the mismatched condition, but a 
ceiling effect is in place under the matched condition, causing reliance to remain significantly 
unaltered by an increase in time pressure. After examining the simple effects using pairwise 
comparisons, I find a significant difference in auditor reliance based on the relevance of 
specialists’ prior experience in cases of low time pressure, but there is no significant difference 
in auditor reliance based on the relevance of specialists’ prior experience when high time 
pressure is present. This finding has important practical implications for audit quality because 
auditors often face strict time deadlines, particularly during busy season. 
As an additional analysis, I examine the interaction between the relevance of specialists’ 
prior experience and auditor-specialist communication on auditors’ actual estimation accuracy. 
Results show that, although allowing auditor-specialist pairs to communicate improves 
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estimation accuracy in the matched condition, the opportunity to communicate actually harms 
estimation accuracy in the mismatched condition. This finding indicates that the push to increase 
auditor-specialist communication may have unintended consequences on audit quality. 
This paper makes several contributions to prior literature. First, auditors’ use of 
specialists, particularly regarding fair value measurements, is an important topic that has 
generally been addressed qualitatively thus far. My study takes the next step forward by focusing 
on several issues identified from the qualitative studies and examining them quantitatively. By 
investigating auditors’ reliance on advice received specifically from specialists, I extend both the 
auditor advice-taking and expertise research streams. I also build on prior auditor communication 
literature by investigating the effects of auditor-specialist interactions and by examining the 
underlying factors of trust, perception of expertise, and social bonding. Furthermore, my study 
has several methodological advantages that contribute to prior research. Because I employ an 
experimental economics setting, I am able to manipulate specialists’ prior experience, which 
would otherwise have to be measured, and the interactive setting I use enables me to smoothly 
implement my communication variable. 
This study also has important implications for practitioners and standard-setters. In 
response to problems regarding the auditor-specialist dynamic, the PCAOB is currently working 
to amend the auditing guidance regarding auditors’ use of specialists. Due to my experimental 
approach, I am able to assess the impact of such amendments ex ante. In doing so, I find that the 
PCAOB’s recommendation for increased communication between auditors and specialists may 
not always have a desirable outcome. When specialists have mismatched experience, auditor 
accuracy is actually better when auditors and specialists do not communicate. My results also 
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indicate that, when a specialist is mismatched, increased time pressure leads to increased auditor 
reliance, which could be harmful to audit quality. 
Because specialists’ work factors into the audit report, which is then referenced by 
investors, regulators, creditors, and other users of the financial statements, it is essential to 
evaluate how auditors utilize specialists’ work when making audit judgments and decisions. 
Regulators and practitioners have noted that auditors appear to over- and under-rely on 
specialists’ work, both of which result in lower audit quality. Regulators, practitioners, and 
academics all identified serious concerns regarding each of the factors considered in this study, 
making this a timely and important topic to explore. 
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APPENDIX A: Instructions to be Read Aloud 
Thank you for participating in today’s study. This study requires you to work on the 
computer at your desk, so please refrain from talking throughout the session. All information in 
the study will remain confidential, and you have the right to withdraw from the study at any 
time. Today’s session is expected to last approximately one hour. For your participation, you will 
be paid $5 at the end of the session today. In addition, you also have the opportunity to earn up to 
$100 in prize money based on the decisions you make. You will receive your total payment at 
the end of the session today. 
The study consists of two stages. At the beginning of Stage 1, the computer will 
randomly assign you to one of two roles, either the Guesser or the Estimator. If you are the 
Estimator, you will receive 20 rounds of specialized training. In each training round, you will (1) 
view a picture of a container filled with some material, (2) make an estimate of the amount of the 
material, and (3) then learn the correct amount. Providing feedback after each round is meant to 
help you refine your estimation process. If you are the Guesser, you will not participate in the 
training rounds, so I have provided various games and puzzles in your envelope that you are 
welcome to use while you wait for the Estimators to finish training. These activities are 
completely optional, so you do not have to use them, but please remember that talking and cell 
phones are not allowed during the session. It is also important to mention that the first stage will 
not affect your winnings, but it does provide training for the second stage, which will determine 
how much prize money you earn. 
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Once Stage 1 is complete, Stage 2 will begin, which also has 20 rounds. At the beginning 
of Stage 2, each Guesser will be partnered with one Estimator. Your task is to work together for 
all 20 rounds, during which time you will make a series of estimates.  In each round, you will be 
shown a picture of a container filled with a material. Then the Guesser and Estimator will each 
submit an initial estimate of the amount of material. [CHAT CONDITION ONLY: You will then 
have the opportunity to chat with your partner on the computer for 30 seconds. Once the chat 
period ends, the Guesser will then be provided with the Estimator’s initial estimate.] [NO CHAT 
CONDITION ONLY: The Guesser will then be provided with the Estimator’s initial estimate.] 
Finally, the Guesser will submit a final estimate, which ends the round. The Guesser-Estimator 
pair with the most accurate final estimate wins the round and earns a prize of $10 to be shared 
equally, so each partner wins $5. In the case of a tie between multiple pairs, the round’s winning 
pair will be randomly determined by the computer. You will learn whether you and your partner 
won a round after all rounds have been completed. 
It is also important to note that each round during Stage 2 has a time limit for both the 
initial and final estimates. The time limit is very important. If you fail to click OK before time 
runs out, the computer will automatically move on, and you will lose the opportunity to win the 
round. To ensure you keep track of time, the time remaining will be displayed in the top right 
corner of your computer screen. 
The study concludes once Stage 2 is complete. You will then fill out a brief 
questionnaire, after which I will pay you the $5 participation fee plus any prize money you 
earned. You will need to sign a receipt form before leaving. 
We are now ready to begin the session. Please remember that talking and cell phones are 
not allowed at any time.  
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APPENDIX B: z-Tree Screenshots 
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APPENDIX C: Post-experimental Questionnaire 
 
Please write your Participant ID Number: ____________ 
 
Based on today’s study, please indicate whether the following statements are true or false: 
 
1. Each Estimator participated in 20 training rounds before starting Stage 2. 
a. True 
b. False 
 
2. The training task in Stage 1 was the same as the task in Stage 2 (estimating the 
number of gumballs). 
a. True 
b. False 
 
3. Stage 2 paired each Guesser with the same Estimator for all 20 rounds to work as a 
team. 
a. True 
b. False 
 
4. Stage 2 limited the time allowed to enter an estimate for some, but not all 20 rounds. 
a. True 
b. False 
 
5. During Stage 2, the Estimator submitted the final amount to determine which pair 
won the round. 
a. True 
b. False 
 
6. It was still possible to win the round if the time limit ran out before entering an 
estimate. 
a. True 
b. False 
 
7. Each round in Stage 2, the winning Guesser-Estimator pair split an additional $10 
prize. 
a. True 
b. False 
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Please circle on the scale how much you agree or disagree with the following statements 
about today’s study:  
 
  
Strongly 
Disagree  
  
 
  
 
  
 
    
 
Strongly 
Agree 
The training rounds provided 
relevant experience for the task 
in Stage 2. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5  6 
 
7 
We were able to make more 
accurate estimates in Stage 2 
because of the training rounds. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5  6 
 
7 
I did not trust my partner. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5  6 
 
7 
I was confident in my partner’s 
estimation accuracy.   
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5  6 
 
7 
I was confident in my own 
estimation accuracy.  
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5  6 
 
7 
I felt that I was more qualified 
than my partner to complete the 
estimation task. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5  6 
 
7 
I was more confident in the 
accuracy of my partner after 
communicating with them. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5  6 
 
7 
I developed a bond with my 
partner.  
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5  6 
 
7 
My partner has relevant 
expertise to complete the 
estimation task. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5  6 
 
7 
I have relevant expertise to 
complete the estimation task.  
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5  6 
 
7 
The time limit made me feel 
rushed.   
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5  6 
 
7 
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General Questions (for multiple choice, only circle one answer): 
 
1. What is your age? __________ 
 
2. What is your gender? 
a. Female 
b. Male 
 
3. How would you classify yourself? 
a. American Indian/Alaska Native 
b. Asian 
c. Black/African American 
d. Hispanic/Latino 
e. Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 
f. White/Caucasian 
g. Multiracial 
h. Would rather not say 
i. Other; Please specify__________ 
 
 
4. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
a. High school or equivalent 
b. Vocational/technical school (2 year) 
c. Some college 
d. Bachelor's degree 
e. Master's degree 
f. Doctoral degree 
g. Professional degree (MD, JD, etc.) 
h. Other; Please specify__________ 
 
5. What is your current student status? 
a. Undergraduate 
b. Graduate 
c. Other; Please specify__________ 
 
6. What is your current/intended major? 
a. Accounting  
b. Finance    
c. Marketing  
d. Management  
e. Information Systems    
f. Undecided 
g. Other; Please specify__________ 
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7. What is your expected graduation year? 
a. 2017 
b. 2018 
c. 2019 
d. 2020 
e. 2021 
f. 2022 or later 
 
Please circle the response that indicates how you generally feel. There are no right or wrong 
answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement. 
 
  
Strongly 
Disagree  
  
 
  
 
  
 
     
 
Strongly 
Agree 
I often accept other people’s 
explanations without further 
thought. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5  6 
 
7 
I feel good about myself. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5  6 
 
7 
I wait to decide on issues 
until I can get more 
information. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5  6 
 
7 
I am confident of my 
abilities.  
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5  6 
 
7 
I often reject statements 
unless I have proof that they 
are true. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5  6 
 
7 
I take my time when making 
decisions.  
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5  6 
 
7 
I tend to immediately accept 
what other people tell me.  
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5  6 
 
7 
I am self-assured. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5  6 
 
7 
My friends tell me that I 
usually question things that I 
see or hear. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5  6 
 
7 
I usually accept things I see, 
read, or hear at face value.  
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5  6 
 
7 
I do not feel sure of myself. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5  6 
 
7 
I usually notice 
inconsistencies in 
explanations. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5  6 
 
7 
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Strongly 
Disagree  
  
 
  
 
  
 
     
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Most often I agree with what 
the others in my group think. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5  6 
 
7 
I dislike having to make 
decisions quickly. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5  6 
 
7 
I have confidence in myself. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5  6 
 
7 
I do not like to decide until 
I’ve looked at all of the 
readily available information. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5  6 
 
7 
I frequently question things 
that I see or hear.  
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5  6 
 
7 
It is easy for other people to 
convince me.  
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5  6 
 
7 
I like to ensure that I’ve 
considered most available 
information before making a 
decision. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5  6 
 
7 
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Spring 2014 – Spring 2017, 7 Total Sections, Average Rating: 4.5/5.0 
 
Introduction to Accounting Principles II – ACCY 202  
Fall 2013 – Spring 2016, 6 Total Sections, Average Rating: 4.4/5.0 
 
  
AWARDS, GRANTS, & HONORS 
 
University of Mississippi Fall Dissertation Fellowship, 2017 
University of Mississippi Summer Graduate Research Grant, 2017 
University of Mississippi Doctoral Teaching Award, 2017 
AAA Deloitte J. Michael Cook Doctoral Consortium Fellow, 2016 
University of Mississippi Graduate Achievement Award, 2015 
University of Mississippi Graduate School Assistantship, 2013-Present 
Rhodes College Graduate Accounting Grant, 2010-2011 
Thompson Dunavanat, PLC Accounting Award (Senior), 2010 
Thompson Dunavanat, PLC Accounting Award (Junior), 2009 
Tennessee Society of Certified Public Accountants Scholarship Award, 2009 
Rhodes College University Scholarship, 2006-2010 
Rhodes College Grant, 2006-2010 
 
 
CONFERENCE PARTICIPATION 
 
AAA Audit Midyear Meeting, 2018 
 Discussant 
AAA Accounting PhD Rookie Recruiting & Research Camp, 2017 
Presenter: “How Do Specialist Expertise, Auditor-Specialist Communication, and Time 
Pressure Affect Auditors’ Use of Specialists’ Valuations?” 
AAA Accounting Behavior and Organizations Research Conference, 2017 
Graduate Research in Accounting Conference at Emory (GRACE), 2017 
Presenter: “How Do Specialist Expertise, Auditor-Specialist Communication, and Time 
Pressure Affect Auditors’ Use of Specialists’ Valuations?” 
AAA Annual Meeting, 2017 
Discussant: ABO section; Auditing section 
 Moderator: ABO section; Auditing section 
 Reviewer: Auditing section 
AAA Audit Midyear Meeting, 2017 
 Doctoral Consortium Participant 
 Reviewer 
AAA Accounting PhD Rookie Recruiting & Research Camp (Observer only), 2016 
AAA Accounting Behavior and Organizations Research Conference, 2016 
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 Doctoral Consortium Participant 
AAA Annual Meeting, 2016 
AAA/Deloitte Foundation/J. Michael Cook Doctoral Consortium, 2016 
Small Group Presentation: “Under What Conditions do Auditors Rely on Specialists’ 
Work Regarding Complex Estimates?” 
AAA Audit Midyear Meeting, 2016 
AAA Financial Accounting and Reporting Section Midyear Meeting, 2014 
 Doctoral Consortium Participant 
  
 
PROFESSIONAL AND ACADEMIC MEMBERSHIPS 
 
American Accounting Association Member 
ABO Section Member 
Auditing Section Member 
Phi Kappa Phi, Interdisciplinary Academic Honor Society 
Omicron Delta Epsilon, International Economics Honor Society 
Chi Alpha Sigma, National College Athlete Honor Society 
 
